Chapter 2

Planning Considerations

The measure of a good plan is not whether execution transpires as planned but whether the plan facilitates effective action in the face of unforeseen events.

FM 3-0

Commanders plan for stability operations and support operations in a manner like they plan for the offense and defense. The mission analysis and command estimate processes outlined in FM 5-0 are equally as important in all types of operations. Analysis using the tactical task areas outlined in FM 7-15 is helpful in focusing the planning effort. Many considerations discussed in this chapter also apply to offensive and defensive operations. However, they appear because the degree or manner in which they apply in these operations differs.

MANUEVER

2-1. The possibility of combat may be remote in some types of stability operations and support operations. In other operations, such as peace enforcement, combatting terrorism, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs), support to insurgency, support to counterdrug operations, and foreign internal defense—combat may be required. Commanders should always plan to have

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the right mix of forces available to quickly transition to combat operations or evacuate. Additionally, when conducting these operations, commanders must consider the feasibility and means of redeployment—possibly to another theater—to conduct other operations.

- 2-2. These operations may involve a higher proportion of combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) forces than are employed to support offensive and defensive operations. In general, CS and CSS forces may have an increased role because of their unique capabilities and the specific mission requirements of these operations. CS and CSS elements may provide the base force or be the only forces employed in some operations.
- 2-3. Maneuver warfare and the applications of direct fires in support of it do not lend themselves to all forms of stability operations or support operations, particularly peacekeeping, foreign humanitarian assistance, and support to civil authorities. On the other hand, armored forces and attack helicopter assets may play major roles in preventive deployments and peace enforcement. These assets could be useful in other operations for force protection, deterrence, and convoy escort; for personnel transport where threats exist; or as a mobile reserve.
- 2-4. Mobility operations improve the movement of units, equipment, and supplies. The friendly force must have freedom of movement in all types of operations. However, in stability operations and support operations, mobility operations may allow civilian traffic and commerce to continue. Resuming the normal civilian activity in an area can be an important objective in an operation. In stability operations, mobility focuses on keeping lines of communications (LOCs) open and on reducing the threat of mines and other unexploded ordinance to soldiers and civilians. In support operations, mobility may focus on removing storm debris or reducing obstacles placed during a civil disturbance.
- 2-5. Army commanders in stability operations and support operations maintain adequate reserves. The reserve is sufficiently armed, trained, equipped, mobile, and positioned to accomplish its mission. A properly task-organized reserve expands each commander's ability to respond to unexpected successes and reversals. They require forces and resources specifically earmarked and available for contingencies. Maintaining reserves in these operations is often difficult. Most policy makers and commanders at all levels reluctantly commit more than the minimum to their reserve when conducting stability operations and support operations. Nonetheless, commanders understand that contingencies may arise that require using the reserve. The maintenance of a reserve allows commanders to plan for worst-case scenarios, provides flexibility, and conserves the force during long-term operations.

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE

2-6. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations allow units to produce intelligence on hostile or neutral forces in the area of operations, as well as the environment (to include weather, terrain, and civil considerations) necessary to make informed decisions. This intelligence answers requirements developed throughout the military decision making process and the execution phase of the operation. Timely and accurate

intelligence encourages audacity and facilitates identifying and exploiting opportunities. Normally, timely and accurate intelligence depends on aggressive and continuous reconnaissance and surveillance.

2-7. Stability operations and support operations demand greater attention to civil considerations—the political, social, economic, and cultural factors in an area of operations (AO)—than do the more conventional offensive and defensive operations. Commanders must expand intelligence preparation of the battlefield beyond geographical and force capability considerations. The centers of gravity frequently are not military forces or terrain but may be restoring basic services or influencing public support. Cultural information is critical to gauge the potential reactions to the operation, to avoid misunderstandings, and to improve the effectiveness of the operation. Changes in the behavior of the populace may suggest a needed change in tactics or even strategy. Biographic information and leadership analysis are key to understanding adversaries or potential adversaries, their methods of operation, and how they interact with the environment. Knowledge of the ethnic and religious factions in the AO and the historical background of the contingency underlying the deployment are vital to mission success, preventing mission creep, and ultimately achieving the objectives of the operation.

2-8. Stability operations and support operations require intelligence operations to focus on developing a clear definition, understanding, and appreciation of all potential threats, to include disease and injury. Success in these operations requires multidisciplined, all-source, fused intelligence. A single-source approach cannot support all requirements. Thorough mission analysis allows commanders to tailor their intelligence capabilities to fit the mission's requirements. Commanders adapt tactically to select the intelligence capabilities needed. They often use human intelligence (HUMINT) and counterintelligence.

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE

2-9. In stability operations and support operations conducted outside the United States (US), HUMINT may provide the most useful source of information. Interpreters, low-level source operations, debriefs of indigenous personnel, screening operations, and patrolling are primary sources for assessing the economic and health needs, military capability, and political intent of those receiving assistance who or are otherwise a party to the contingency. Commanders should emphasize to all personnel the importance of always being intelligence conscious and should provide basic guidelines to improve their intelligence-gathering capability. Medical personnel must be aware of the Geneva Convention restrictions against medical personnel collecting information of intelligence value except that which is observed incidentally while accomplishing their humanitarian duties.

2-10. HUMINT is particularly important in support for counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and counterdrug operations. FM 2-91.1 provides techniques such as pattern and link analysis that aid in HUMINT analysis.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

2-11. Counterintelligence is active in stability operations and support operations even if no well-defined threat exists. Adversary HUMINT efforts focus on gaining access to US military personnel and operations information by providing services such as laundry and cooking. Or they may attempt to exploit members of the local populace who interact with US forces. Counterintelligence (CI) personnel develop an estimate of the threat and recommend appropriate actions. During multinational and interagency operations these personnel establish procedures and safeguards for the protection, handling, and release of classified or sensitive information to the forces of other nations and to supported elements. Essential elements of friendly information must be safeguarded to protect the force. During multinational operations, commanders must be alert that a coalition partner may conduct covert intelligence operations against US forces. CI operations must deal with this possibility in a sensitive way and, if possible, without offending partners.

SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE

2-12. Surveillance and reconnaissance may be employed to determine the disposition, activities, and intentions of civilian populations (hostile and neutral) and uniformed or irregular threats. Reconnaissance for information collection and security continues throughout the operation. Success requires integrating all available information from civil and military sources. In foreign humanitarian assistance operations, reconnaissance helps determine how and where to effectively apply limited assets to benefit the most people. Units conducting domestic support operations conduct reconnaissance to help determine when and where to apply manpower and resources. Forces conducting domestic support operations must know the legal limitations when acquiring information on civilians. (FM 3-55 further discusses reconnaissance.)

2-13. In many instances international organizations and nongovermental organizations (NGOs) will have been in the area of operations long before US forces. These organizations produce reports, have web sites, and maintain databases of immense value. In the case of mines or unexploded ordnance, there is often a global positioning system reference collection of minefield survey data. US forces can access much of this information before deploying. Although commanders may access this information using intelligence operations, sound civil-military coordination may be a more effective approach. Nonmilitary organizations can provide valuable information; however, they may resent being considered a source of intelligence. Because of the nature of their work, some organizations must remain independent and nonaligned with any military force. Commanders foster communications and share valuable information with these organizations to become familiar with cultures and sensitivities of the local population. Sharing relevant information is an element of information management (see Command and Control later in this chapter) and not ISR.

PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

2-14. Priority intelligence requirements (PIR) in stability operations and support operations may differ from those in offensive and defensive operations. In combat operations, PIR focuses on the enemy's military capability and

intentions. However, intelligence collection in stability operations and support operations may adjust to the people and their cultures, politics, crime, religion, economics, and related factors, and any variances within affected groups of people.

2-15. Generally, in offensive and defensive operations, PIR are answered and targets are attacked and destroyed. In stability operations and support operations, collection and production to answer PIR may be ongoing tasks. For example, PIR related to treaty verification or force protection may continue as long as the mission requires.

NONTRADITIONAL DATABASES

2-16. In addition to traditional databases, nontraditional databases may be developed to address varied needs such as police checkpoints, storage sites, license plates, personalities, treaty compliance, site declarations, and mass gravesites. The staff updates databases daily. Databases also have enough flexibility for commanders as well as others to use them rapidly.

REQUIREMENT TO CONTINUOUSLY MONITOR TARGETS

2-17. Targeting guidance may require developing targeting data on numerous targets that may not be attacked but remain valid targets. The requirement to continuously monitor targets and update targeting data can create large databases requiring major effort.

INTELLIGENCE SYNCHRONIZATION

2-18. In addition to their organic assets, collection managers must be able to synchronize their collection efforts with a broad range of collection assets operating in the AO over which they have no direct control. These assets may include CI and HUMINT collection teams under control of another agency; signals intelligence and imagery intelligence collectors under control of a joint task force (JTF); and collectors under the control of friendly elements such as the host nation or coalition.

SPLIT-BASED OPERATIONS

2-19. There is increased reliance on split-based intelligence operations in stability operations and support operations. They help overcome certain constraints that are often present, such as force caps and limited lift availability. They allow commanders to deploy their force into an area and still receive continuous, relevant, and timely intelligence and electronic warfare support during all stages of the operation. Split-based operations use direct broadcast technology from collection platforms, assured intelligence communications, and small deployable intelligence support elements. Intelligence organizations outside the AO push intelligence forward and simultaneously receive PIR and request information for collection and processing.

MAPPING

2-20. Map coverage can be a significant challenge in any operation. In these operations, because they are often conducted in unanticipated areas with multinational forces or nonmilitary agencies participating, standardized map

coverage significantly aids in the planning and conduct of operations. The accuracy, scale, and currency of foreign maps may vary widely from US products. Consideration should be given to releasing US map data to other agencies and organizations as soon as possible. Release of US mapping materials may require foreign disclosure approval. (FM 2-91.1 includes tactics, techniques, and procedures for the roles, responsibilities, and activities of intelligence support in these operations.)

FIRE SUPPORT

LETHAL CAPABILITIES

- 2-21. Fire support assists commanders in carefully balancing deterrent force with combat power to accomplish the stability operation or the support operation and to protect the force. Precision munitions provide the commander with an important capability. Mortars, artillery, and special aircraft can provide illumination for demonstrating deterrent capability, for observing congested areas, for supporting friendly base security, or in support of patrolling maneuver forces.
- 2-22. Artillery fires, in particular rockets and rounds with ordnance (though relatively selective and accurate), involve a significantly higher possibility of collateral damage. In addition, unexploded ordnance can pose a safety hazard to the indigenous population and provide a local combatant with the foundation for an explosive device. Commanders should cautiously use conventional artillery fires. They should also carefully select munitions to minimize collateral damage and the threat to both friendly forces and local populations.
- 2-23. Field artillery howitzers and rocket systems provide both continuous deterrents to hostile action and a destructive force multiplier for commanders. To deal with an indirect fire threat, the force may locate hostile indirect fire systems using counterfire radars. The information generated can be used to document violations of cease-fire agreements and fix responsibility for damage and civilian casualties.
- 2-24. AC-130 aircraft, attack helicopters, and observation or scout helicopters are important target acquisition, deterrent, and attack assets in stability operations. Tactical air (TACAIR) can provide selective firepower, particularly in employing precision-guided munitions. Collateral damage and unexploded ordnance are significant planning factors when commanders consider using TACAIR.
- 2-25. Fire support coordination, planning, and clearance demands special arrangements with joint and multinational forces and local authorities. These arrangements include communications and language requirements, liaison personnel, and established procedures focused on interoperability. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) standardization agreements (STANAGs) provide excellent examples of coordinated fire support arrangements. These provide participants with common terminology and procedures. Rules of engagement (ROE) should provide guidelines for clearing indirect fires (both lethal and nonlethal).
- 2-26. In general, commanders apply firepower with great restraint in these operations and consider restrictive ROE developed to fit the situation.

Specifically, with respect to fire support systems, even the most accurate of these weapons have extensive killing power, can injure or kill noncombatants, and may unnecessarily destroy property. Firepower is most often employed or displayed in operations that approach the threshold of war such as shows of force, demonstrations, and peace enforcement.

NONLETHAL CAPABILITIES

2-27. Nonlethal capabilities extend the range of firepower options. They augment means of deadly force. They are particularly valuable in both stability operations and support operations as they enhance the ability to apply force in proportion to the threat and allow discrimination in its use. They expand the number of options available to confront situations that do not warrant using deadly force but require soldiers to use overwhelming, decisive power to accomplish their missions. Many capabilities exist that create nonlethal effects on personnel or materiel. Such capabilities include, but are not limited to, irritants—such as CS, nonpenetrating projectiles, high-pressure water devices, smoke, and obscurants—and military working dogs. Nonlethal capabilities must show military necessity, must be used proportionally, and must not result in unnecessary suffering. Additionally, using riot control agents to counter domestic disturbances requires prior presidential approval. (See Appendix B for guidance on riot control agents.) The Military Police Corps is the Army's proponent on the training and employment of nonlethal munitions. FM 3-19.15 and FM 3-19.40 detail the characteristics and use of nonlethal munitions.

2-28. Military deception, psychological operations (PSYOP), electronic warfare, counterpropaganda, and computer network attack illustrate elements of offensive information operations (IO) that commanders use as nonlethal means to target adversaries in stability operations and support operations. (See Information Operations later in this chapter and FM 3-13.)

AIR DEFENSE

2-29. Stability operations require forces to be thoroughly trained on passive and active air defense measures. Soldiers must train in aircraft recognition and ROE since more than one of the forces involved may fly similar aircraft. Air defense considerations are more important in peace enforcement operations that enforce sanctions or deny or guarantee movement.

2-30. Adversaries may use extensive measures such as cover and concealment, hand-held surface-to-air missiles, and light air defense artillery weapons to protect themselves from air attack. Since many targets will be in belligerent-controlled areas, commanders must weigh the potential loss rate of aircraft against the returns that air interdiction missions might produce. However, they should also consider that curtailing rotary and low-level, fixedwing operations may be one of the goals of the belligerent. Commanders must also consider a belligerent's use of unconventional air defense tactics, such as using rocket-propelled grenades against helicopters.

2-31. Air and missile defense (AMD) forces protect US forces and installations from aerial threats and may be responsible for protecting the population and facilities of the host nation, NGOs, and international organizations. AMD

forces counter the aerial threat posed by helicopters; fixed-wing aircraft; cruise missiles; and tactical, intermediate, and intercontinental ballistic missiles. These threats may be used as the means to deliver chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive payloads.

2-32. AMD sensors, and command and control elements, provide early warning against aerial attack, and they contribute to the common operational picture. Air defense assets are ideally suited to distinguish between friendly and belligerent aircraft over safe havens or in no-fly zones. Participation in these operations by nations with different types of aircraft and communications capability can make discriminating friendly aircraft difficult. AMD units may also assist in airspace control operations in stability operations and support operations.

MOBILITY/COUNTERMOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY

2-33. Military police, engineer, and chemical forces provide essential support during stability operations and support operations to ensure a mobile, survivable force. Planners consider all available capabilities, to include *other services*, multinational forces, contractors, and troop units (including reserve components). The latter requires greater reaction time than active components do. Planners consider the specific capability and availability of the units when building the force, along with leasable facilities and the infrastructure. The JTF contingency engineer manager normally provides staff assistance to the JTF commander (who controls engineer assets). Similar considerations apply to multinational forces.

2-34. Planners must consider interoperability to ensure that assets are complimentary, if not compatible. Engineer planners also consider personnel or materiel assets available through contracts, local sources, and private agencies, including the logistics civilian augmentation program (LOGCAP).

2-35. Engineer operations require large amounts of construction materials that may be acquired locally, regionally, and from the continental United States. These materials may be obtained through military supply channels or by contract. Engineers identify, prioritize, and requisition required construction material consistent with acquisition regulations. Supply units process the requisition and acquire, receive, store, and transport construction materials. This support may also be provided through a combination of engineer unit Class IV acquisition and storage by LOGCAP contractor support.

COMBAT ENGINEER SUPPORT

2-36. Combat engineer support may be required in various stability operations, to include peace operations (PO), noncombatant evacuation operations, and foreign internal defense. This type of support falls under the categories of mobility, countermobility, and survivability, and includes such tasks as—

- Constructing command posts and bunkers.
- Constructing force protection structures such as earth revetments, wire obstacles, and fighting positions.
- Clearing fields of observation.
- Marking minefields, to include minefield fence maintenance.

- Demolishing fortifications.
- Clearing mines and debris from roads.
- Conducting route reconnaissance to support LOCs.
- Clearing mines, unexploded ordnance, and booby traps from building, vehicles, and other locations.
- Providing backup support for explosive and ordnance identification, marking, removal, or demolition.
- · Providing technical expertise to maneuver forces.

GENERAL ENGINEER SUPPORT

2-37. Overseas, general engineering missions can assist the host nation by constructing facilities and supporting government or civil agencies. Engineers may also teach basic skills to indigenous civilian and military personnel and then work together on projects that support host nation institutional and infrastructure development. Domestically, engineers are integral to relief and recovery from disasters and emergencies. General engineering contributes to relief by—

- Assessing damages to structures, utilities, and so forth.
- Supporting search and rescue efforts with personnel and equipment.
- Clearing rubbled areas, mud, or snow.
- Restoring critical facilities, services, and utilities.
- Demolishing unsafe structures.
- Providing emergency power to critical facilities.
- Constructing temporary bridges.
- Providing expedient repair of critical distribution systems.
- Cutting fire breaks with equipment, chain saws, and hand tools.

2-38. Combat engineer elements can provide general engineering to the force; however, most construction requires additional engineer units. The combat heavy and other specialized engineer units are most important for developing base camps, logistic facilities, roads, and airfields. Other examples of general engineering missions include building temporary shelters, locating potable water sources, drilling water wells, and repairing bridges.

CHEMICAL UNITS

2-39. Commanders must consider the requirement for chemical support if evidence exists that belligerent forces or terrorists have employed agents or have the potential for doing so. In addition, when authorized, riot control agents may be selectively employed as an alternative to deadly force. A mix of different units—decontamination units; nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) reconnaissance elements; and smoke units—are often necessary to properly balance capabilities. Additional capabilities include limited water transfer, spray, and storage. Chemical staff officers participating in the intelligence process advise the commander of commercial and industrial chemical threats.

LOGISTICS AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

2-40. Army CSS enables the commander to execute his mission and sustain the force. This is true throughout the range of Army operations. CSS forces may be employed in nonstandard tasks or in quantities disproportionate to their normal roles. Like all other elements, they must be capable of self-defense, particularly if they deploy alone or in advance of other Army forces. Army CSS is discussed in FM 4-0.

2-41. Because the logistic requirements in stability operations and support operations vary widely, mission analysis determines the proper CSS capabilities required. CSS assets are allocated based on those requirements. For example, it may be necessary to deploy additional material—such as tactical bridging and water purification equipment—to restore critical services and infrastructure. No standard arrangement fits all situations.

IMPORTANCE OF NONSTANDARD LOGISTICS

2-42. Host-nation support, contracting, and local purchases are force multipliers in many of these operations. Situations that lack optimal sustaining capabilities may require using nonstandard logistics. They may augment or replace existing CSS capability. They can reduce dependence on the logistic system, improve response time, and free airlift and sealift for other priority needs. Contracting personnel should precede the main body of Army forces if feasible. Nonstandard logistics may be employed for—

- Limited supplies such as Classes I, II, III, IV, and IX.
- Services such as catering, maintenance and repair, sanitation, and laundry.
- · Rental services such as mobile communications.
- Transportation.

2-43. The LOGCAP is advanced acquisition planning to use civilian contractors during wartime and unforeseen military emergencies augmenting the Army combat support and combat service support capability. The LOGCAP objective is to preplan for the use of contractors to perform selected services to augment Army forces. See AR 700-137 for LOGCAP information.

2-44. Commanders can expect that contractors will be involved in stability operations and support operations. The management and control of contractors differs from the command and control of soldiers and Department of the Army (DA) civilians. During military operations, soldiers and DA civilians are under the direct command and control of the military chain of command. Commanders can direct soldier and DA civilian task assignment, special recognition, and disciplinary action. However, they do not have the same control over contractors. The terms and conditions of the contract establish the relationship between the military and the contractor. See FM 3-100.21 for specific considerations.

2-45. Commanders and staff planners must assess the need for providing force protection to a contractor and designate forces to provide security when appropriate. The mission of, threat to, and location of the contractor determines the degree of force protection needed. Protecting contractors involve not only active protection through the use of armed military forces to provide

escort or perimeter security, but also training and equipping of contractor personnel in self-protection (NBC and weapons). When the threat exists and the commander of a combatant command has granted approval, contractor personnel may be trained and equipped to work in an NBC environment. The same personnel may carry individual, military specification weapons for personal protection, provided the contractors' company policy permits and the employee agrees.

CSS TO OTHER AGENCIES

2-46. When directed, logistic assistance is provided to agencies other than the US military that lack the capability to sustain operations. Army CSS capabilities—such as transportation, supply, or medical services—often support other agencies, private organizations, and individuals during these operations. At the same time they continue to support friendly forces.

COMBAT HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT

2-47. Combat health resources may be used across a broad spectrum of missions (from consulting to delivering health care) in stability operations and support operations. Due to Title 10 restrictions and the constraints imposed by the Geneva Conventions, the command surgeon, in conjunction with the staff judge advocate advises the commander on which groups of individuals are eligible beneficiaries to receive military health care and the methods of reimbursement for services rendered. In humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, the population served will differ from the traditional healthy and fit military force, and will be comprised of children; infants; and obstetrical, gynecological, and geriatric patients. The composition of the affected population will require augmentation of existing medical equipment sets with specialized equipment, instruments, and medicines. Consultation and advice may be required to assist the host nation in enhancing or developing the medical infrastructure, civilian medical programs, basic health and sanitation services, and animal husbandry programs.

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

2-48. Many possible sources of funding exist in stability operations and support operations; legal restrictions often limit using these funds. Unauthorized expenditure of funds can lead to criminal or administrative action against those responsible. Some basic principles participants in these operations should be aware of include—

- Expenditures must be reasonably related to the purpose for which Congress made the appropriations.
- Expenditures must not fall specifically within the scope of some other category of appropriation (such as Title 10 Operations and Maintenance funds versus Title 22 Security Assistance Funds).
- If two appropriations permit the expenditure, either may be used, but not in combination or interchangeably to achieve the same objective. This is a prohibition against augmentation of funds.
- Upon mission receipt, resource managers must begin accounting for expenditures and tracking the use of CSS assets to capture costs of the operation for reimbursement. Financial accountability at all levels is

important for reimbursement and is legally required for reporting the costs of operations to Congress.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

2-49. Because stability operations and support operations tend to be joint, multinational, or interagency, they are often planned and conducted in concert with those outside the US military. As stated in Chapter 1, Army forces are often the supporting organization rather than the lead agency. However, the efforts of all involved must be coordinated toward a unified effort. Senior Army commanders devote much of their time and energy to the problems of coordination and cooperation. Commanders use liaison elements and coordination centers to facilitate unity of effort. (Appendix A discusses liaison and coordination centers.)

2-50. No single command and control (C2) option works best for all stability operations and support operations. Commanders should be flexible in modifying standard arrangements to meet specific requirements of each situation and to promote unity of effort.

2-51. When operating inside a multinational organization, commanders should expect to integrate units down to the company level for combat units, and to the individual level for support units. Commanders must train with this reality in mind. Units operate under established procedures modified to accord with the standing operating procedures for the alliance or multinational coalition. It is accepted that effectiveness will initially decrease when operating in a multinational force, but through training and understanding of standards and procedures, unit performance will improve.

2-52. One factor that distinguishes stability operations and support operations from offensive and defensive operations is the requirement for interagency coordination at the task force level and below. In interagency operations, Army commanders have inherent responsibilities including the requirements to clarify the mission; to determine the controlling legal and policy authorities; and to task, organize, direct, sustain, and care for the organizations and individuals for whom they provide the interagency effort. They also assure seamless termination under conditions that ensure the identified objectives are met and can be sustained after the operation.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

2-53. The ground commander often executes the military portion of an interagency plan. He must know and understand the relationship that Army forces have with others participating in the operation.

2-54. Although the US can conduct stability operations and support operations unilaterally, it seldom pursues its national interests alone. Several options may be employed for the C2 of multinational forces including coalitions and alliances. See FM 3-16 for additional considerations in C2 in multinational operations.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

2-55. Information management is a critical C2 consideration during all operations. In stability operations and support operations, sharing of relevant

information with NGOs, local officials, police, and other non-military agencies will achieve effective coordination and unity of effort. Approaches to civilian organizations, including the media, for information should be open and transparent, including a clear statement of the use of the information. This will avoid undermining cooperative efforts with such agencies.

Information management is the provision of relevant information to the right person at the right time in a usable form to facilitate situational understanding and decision making. It uses procedures and information systems to collect, process, store, display, and disseminate data and information.

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2-56. Clarity and accuracy of information are critical, especially when involving multiple agencies in activities such as scheduling airlifts and processing resources. Information sharing is essential to establish ground truth—a critical and sensitive process. Not all agencies may agree on the nature or scope of support required or on the operation's progress. To preempt false impressions, Army forces routinely share information with other agencies. Information sharing helps other agencies execute their missions. For example, providing overhead photography to relief officials can assist in the design and construction of needed refugee camps or aid search efforts. Data on the quantity and type of relief aid moved by various means can assist in the transportation planning of other agencies. Sharing information on the use of cluster munitions and other ordnance is needed to help establish safe routes for returning refugees and to protect the local population along with the international and nongovermental organizations in the AO.

OTHER PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

METT-TC ANALYSIS

2-57. The planning process outlined in FM 5-0 is valid for all operations. However, the nature of the environment in which forces conduct stability operations and support operations requires commanders and staff to view the six factors of METT-TC—mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations—from a different perspective than when conducting offensive and defensive operations. Analyzing the factors of METT-TC is critical during the military decision making process (MDMP). The impact of each factor will differ from operation to operation, but each must be considered carefully in light of the operational environment:

• *Mission*. In stability operations and support operations, the missions may come from various sources. The operation order of a higher head-quarters may not be the only source for mission analysis. Terms of reference, special agreements (such as the Dayton Accords for Bosnia-Herzegovina or the Military-Technical Agreement regarding Kosovo), status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs), ROE, status of mission agreements, and executive orders are examples of mandates and declarations that must be reviewed for mission requirements. A

- comprehensive mission analysis is the best safeguard against mission creep (see discussion of Mission Creep in Chapter 1).
- Enemy. The characterization of the enemy is a critical concern in stability operations and support operations. For combat operations conducted in support of stability operations, such as forcible separation of adversaries during peace enforcement operations, the enemy is analyzed, as it would be for offensive and defensive operations. But for other operations, the concept of *enemy* could be much different. In PO, it is the conflict and not the parties to the conflict that is the enemy. In complex contingencies, it may be hunger or disease and not competing political factions that is the enemy. Forces conducting domestic counterdrug operations must carefully avoid characterizing the object of their surveillance as a military enemy. Commanders must guard against taking actions that would inadvertently create an enemy where there was not one. For example, the impression that one of the parties to a conflict is receiving favorable treatment could turn other parties against the PO forces (as in Lebanon when Shi'a forces attacked US Marines whom they saw as favoring the Maronite Christian-dominated government). See the discussion of Modified Concept of the Enemy in Chapter 1.
- *Terrain and weather*. The five military aspects of terrain—observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles and movement, and cover and concealment (OAKOC)—remain valid, but the way the commanders use these aspects to analyze the environment may require a different perspective. Decisive terrain may not be a hilltop or defile, but rather the attitude of the people or civil infrastructure. The impact of weather on civilians and the potential for a worsening humanitarian crisis may create unique concerns for commanders in stability operations and support operations.
- *Troops*. When considering troops available, commanders must expand their thinking to consider different sources of support to the mission. Many stability operations and support operations require a greater mix of combat support and combat service support units than do offensive and defensive operations. Multinational forces, other US government agencies, contractors, and host-nation civilians may be available to support the commander in accomplishing his mission. Commanders will also seek to coordinate and leverage the substantial contributions to the overall goals of the operation made by international and non-governmental organizations.
- *Time*. Commanders at all levels must consider the possibility of long-term commitment to some stability operations. As a result of the 1978 Camp David Accords, Army forces have been providing peacekeepers to the multinational forces and observers for more than 20 years. As a result of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, NATO-assigned US forces continue to enforce the peace in Bosnia after five years. Many support operations, such as disaster relief missions, only last a matter of weeks. Planners must anticipate long-term commitments that may require rotating units or individuals.
- *Civil considerations*. Civil considerations are important in all operations but are a critical concern in stability operations and support

operations. The primary purpose of many of these operations is improving the quality of life of the local populace, whether through mitigating the effects of disasters or creating a secure environment for social, economic, and political development.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

2-58. Military commanders must consider not only the military forces, but also the environment in which those forces operate. One factor of the environment that commanders must consider is the civilian populace and its impact—whether it is supportive, neutral, or hostile to the presence of military forces. A supportive populace can provide resources that facilitate friendly operations. It can also provide a positive climate for military and diplomatic activities that a nation pursues to achieve foreign policy objectives. A hostile populace threatens the immediate operations of deployed friendly forces and can often undermine public support at home for the nation's policy objectives.

2-59. Civil-military operations (CMO) are the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces (JP 3-57). The very nature of stability operations and support operations places our forces in direct contact with civilians, governments, and NGOs. This relationship makes CMO critical to any stability operation or support operation.

2-60. CMO have three objectives. CMO enhance military effectiveness by reducing interference with military operations by the civil population. They support our national objectives by encouraging the development of a country's material and human resources. And lastly, CMO reduce the negative impact of military operations on civilians. Some support operations, such as domestic support operations and foreign humanitarian relief, are in and of themselves CMO. Some stability operations include civil-military activities in support of the larger mission and objective. For example, emergency civil administration conducted as part of a peace enforcement mission is a civil-military operation. JP 3-57 and FM 3-57 discuss specific CMO activities.

2-61. The G5/S5 is the principal staff officer for all matters concerning civil-military operations. The G5/S5 must enhance the relationship between military forces and civilian authorities and personnel in the AO. The G5/S5 is required at all echelons from battalion through corps level, but authorized only at division and corps levels. Once deployed, units below division level may be authorized an S5. (See FM 6-0.) The CMO staff may be augmented with civil affairs (CA) teams to assist in planning and executing CMO. CA forces are an essential element of CMO by virtue of their area and linguistic

orientation, cultural awareness, training in military-to-host nation advisory activities, and civilian professional skills that parallel common government functions.

PROTECTION

2-62. Protection is the preservation of the fighting potential of a force so the commander can apply maximum force at the decisive time and place. Protection has four components: force protection, field discipline, safety, and fratricide avoidance. Protection bears significantly on every aspect of stability operations and support operations. Commanders must take great pains to protect the force from attack. Adversaries opposed to US interests, or who seek to destabilize an area, will go to great lengths to expel US forces. They will employ terrorist tactics such as bombings, kidnappings, assassinations, ambushes, and raids. Commanders address force protection during planning and revise their plan as necessary during execution. (FM 3-07.2 provides a process by which commanders can assess the threat to the force and act to defeat that threat.) This does not mean that commanders must isolate their troops from contact with the indigenous population. Mission degradation, or even increased risk to the force, can result if commanders restrain forces from conducting prudent missions and establishing an active and capable presence in the area.

Force Protection

2-63. Because of unusual and uncertain threats associated with stability operations and support operations, force protection is a key consideration for commanders. Force protection consists of those actions to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense (DOD) personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. It minimizes the effects of enemy firepower (including weapons of mass destruction, maneuver, and information) (see FM 3-07.2). Commanders attempt to accomplish a mission with minimal loss of personnel, equipment, and supplies by integrating force protection considerations into all aspects of the operations process. But the commander must balance force protection measures against a "bunker mentality" in his force and diminishing interaction with the indigenous population. Force protection consists of air, space, and missile defense; NBC defense; antiterrorism; defensive IO; and local security to operational forces and means.

2-64. Air, Space, and Missile Defense. The commander must consider the use of air defense artillery forces if evidence exists of belligerent forces having the ability to employ fixed- or rotary-winged aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, or cruise missiles against any friendly forces, civilians, or NGOs he is obligated to protect. Stability operations in these situations require forces to be thoroughly trained on passive and active air defense measures. Visual aircraft recognition may be particularly challenging since more than one of the forces involved may use similar aircraft. Air defense considerations are more important in peace enforcement operations that deny or guarantee movement and safe passage or that enforce sanctions (see JP 3-10).

2-65. NBC Defense. NBC defensive measures provide the capability to defend against attack by nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and to

survive and sustain combat operations in an NBC environment. Survival and sustainment must use the following principles: avoidance of NBC hazards, particularly contamination; protection of individuals and units from unavoidable NBC hazards; and decontamination. An effective NBC defense counters belligerent threats and attacks by minimizing vulnerabilities, protecting friendly forces, and maintaining an operational tempo that complicates targeting. By denying or countering any advantages that the adversary may accrue from using NBC weapons, Army forces and their multinational partners significantly deter their use.

2-66. Antiterrorism. Antiterrorism is the defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces (JP 1-02) (see JP 3-07.2 and Chapter 5). Terrorism may well be the most likely threat that Army forces will face when conducting stability operations and support operations. Commanders have an inherent responsibility for planning, resourcing, training, exercising, and executing antiterrorism measures to provide for the security of the command. Likewise, every soldier, DOD employee, independent contractor, and local national hired by DOD has an inherent responsibility to maintain vigilance for possible terrorist actions.

2-67. **Defensive IO.** See Information Operations in this chapter.

2-68. **Security.** At the operational level, rear area and base security contributes to force protection (see JP 3-10.1). Commanders should consider—

- Sites, accommodations, and defensive positions. Precautions should be taken to protect positions, headquarters, support facilities, and accommodations. These may include obstacles and shelters. Units must also practice alert procedures and develop drills to rapidly occupy positions. A robust engineer force can provide support to meet survivability needs. Units should maintain proper camouflage and concealment based on METT-TC. Additional information on precautions is provided in FM 3-34.112 and FM 3-06.
- **Roadblocks**. Military police (MP) forces may establish and maintain roadblocks. If MP forces are unavailable, other forces may assume this responsibility. Roadblocks can be used not only to restrict traffic for security purposes, but also to control the movement of critical cargo in support of humanitarian operations. As a minimum, the area should be highly visible and defensible with an armed overwatch.
- *Personnel vulnerabilities*. Forces are always vulnerable to personnel security risks from local employees and other personnel subject to bribes, threats, or compromise. The threat from local criminal elements is also a constant threat and force protection consideration.
- *Personal awareness*. The single most proactive measure for survivability is individual awareness by soldiers in all circumstances. Soldiers must look for things out of place and patterns preceding aggression. Commanders should ensure that soldiers remain alert, do not establish a routine, and maintain appearance and bearing.
- *Sniper threats*. In stability operations and support operations, the sniper can pose a significant threat. Counters include rehearsed responses, reconnaissance and surveillance, and cover and

- concealment. ROE should provide specific instructions on how to react to sniper fire, to include restrictions on weapons to be used. Units can use specific weapons, such as sniper rifles, to eliminate a sniper and reduce collateral damage.
- *Security measures*. Security measures are METT-TC dependent and may include the full range of active and passive measures such as patrolling, reconnaissance and surveillance, and use of reaction forces.
- *Coordination*. Commanders should coordinate security with local military and civil agencies and humanitarian organizations when possible.
- *Evacuation*. Commanders must have a plan to evacuate the force should conditions warrant, such as war erupting during the conduct of a peacekeeping operations or a host nation withdrawing support for humanitarian assistance. This plan should include appropriate routes for ground, sea, or air evacuation. All units should rehearse their evacuation plan and develop contingency plans that cover such tasks as the breakout of an encirclement or the fighting of a delaying action. Operations security (OPSEC) is critical as public knowledge of such plans or witnessing of a rehearsal could erode the confidence of the local population and thus the legitimacy of the mission.

Field Discipline

2-69. Field discipline guards soldiers from the physical and psychological effects of the environment. Soldiers can adapt to the point where they outperform indigenous populations. Commanders take every measure and precaution to keep soldiers healthy and maintain their morale. Such actions include securing equipment and supplies from loss or damage. Commanders ensure that systems are in place for adequate health services to include preventive medicine and medical surveillance programs, stress control, and medical laboratory services. They provide effective systems for maintenance evacuation and rapid replacement or repair of equipment.

Safety

2-70. Commanders in stability operations and support operations may reduce the chance of mishap by conducting risk assessments, assigning a safety officer and staff, conducting a safety program, and seeking advice from local personnel. The safety program should begin with training conducted before deployment and continue throughout the deployment. Training will include factors that could affect safety such as the environment, terrain, road conditions, and local driving habits; access or possession of live ammunition; unlocated or uncleared mine fields; and special equipment such as tanks and other systems that present special hazards. Safety is also important during off-duty and recreational activities. If possible, the safety officer and staff should coordinate with local authorities concerning environmental and health concerns. The presence of US forces should not adversely impact the environment (see FM 5-19).

Fratricide Avoidance

2-71. Most measures taken to avoid fratricide in stability operations and support operations are the same as those measures taken during offensive and defensive operations. However, commanders must consider other factors such as local hires or NGO personnel that may be as much at risk as US forces. Fratricide avoidance is an important part of CMO; effective civil-military coordination and sharing of information will reduce fratricide and collateral damage. Accurate information about the locations and activities of both friendly and hostile forces (situational understanding) and an aggressive airspace management plan assist commanders in avoiding fratricide. Liaison officers increase situational understanding and enhance interoperability. Using night vision light-intensifier devices aids units in target identification during limited visibility. ROE might prevent soldiers from using some weapon systems and lessen the risk of fratricide. The collateral effects of friendly weapons in urban and restricted terrain can affect fratricide. Soldiers must know the penetration, ricochet, and blast consequences of their own weapons.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

2-72. Information is at the very heart of many stability operations. In fact, IO may be designated as the main effort during certain phases of an operation. These operations are often sensitive and politically charged where perception and public support may be centers of gravity. In stability operations, IO may be the most critical and acceptable means of achieving stated objectives consistent with the ROE.

2-73. As an element of combat power, information plays a critical role in stability operations and support operations. IO will have an even greater relative importance given the reduced emphasis on firepower in stability operations and support operations. Refer to FM 3-13 for a more comprehensive and detailed discussion.

Offensive IO

2-74. Offensive information operations are the integrated use of assigned and supporting capabilities and activities, mutually supported by intelligence, to affect enemy decision makers or to influence others to achieve or promote specific objectives (FM 3-0). Offensive IO may impact more in stability operations and support operations because they promote legitimacy and reduce bias, ignorance, and confusion by persuading, educating, coordinating, or influencing. Soldiers, participants, and populations must understand the objectives and motives of friendly forces, as well as the scope and duration of friendly actions.

2-75. Public affairs and CMO are activities related to IO. Both communicate information to critical audiences to influence their understanding and perception of military operations. Related activities are distinct from IO because they do not manipulate or distort information; their effectiveness stems from their credibility with the local populace and news media. Public affairs and CMO—prime sources of information—link the force, the local populace, and the news media. They also provide assessments of how military operations impact civilians, neutrals, and others in the area of operations.

2-76. Adversaries and other organizations will use propaganda and disinformation against the force to influence the public. PSYOP and public affairs must work closely with the intelligence community to be predictive, rather than reactive, to such attacks. Public affairs personnel inform and counter the effects of propaganda and misinformation. FM 3-61 contains details on conducting public affairs activities. The command should establish mechanisms such as a joint information bureau and media working groups to educate as well as inform local and international media. An informed public, with accurate and timely information, is a force multiplier in stability operations and support operations.

Defensive IO

2-77. Defensive information operations are the integration and coordination of policies and procedures, operations, personnel, and technology to protect and defend friendly information and information (FM 3-0). IO are critical to preserving operations security and freedom of action. Protecting information is key to protecting the force and the mission. The need to be candid and responsive to requests for information must balance the need to protect operational information, such as troop movements, security plans, and vulnerabilities. Working closely with all parties, information operations planners must develop the essential elements of friendly information to preclude inadvertent public disclosure of critical or sensitive information.

2-78. A critical aspect of IO is the discovery of capabilities and intentions of potential adversaries and threats. In stability operations and support operations, such adversaries will use IO to integrate all elements of their power and capabilities to target friendly forces. The likely adversaries that US forces may face in these operations will not be concerned about information superiority and will seek only temporary advantages at critical points and times. They may see Western concepts of laws of conflict as an unnecessary handicap and be willing to use deception, trickery, civilian-run enterprise, or the media when implementing an IO campaign. Friendly forces should expect that adversary IO will include all venues and media that adversary leadership can manipulate, including—

- Adversary propaganda directed at friendly forces and propaganda for domestic consumption.
- Statecraft and public diplomacy used to generate media events that serve IO objectives.
- Censorship of domestic and international media as well as use of all media to transmit propaganda and false, misleading information to all audiences.

DEPLOYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT

2-79. In stability operations and support operations strategic deployment and redeployment planning and execution considerations are the same as those for any other operation. However, some considerations deserve special emphasis.

Unit Preparation and Training

2-80. Warfighting skills developed and honed in training form the basis for mission success. Combat-ready units can adapt readily to noncombat situations, but units not trained to standard cannot survive in combat. The knowledge, discipline, cohesion, and technical skills necessary to defeat an enemy are also needed in environments that seem far removed from the battlefield. The combat capability of Army forces is the basis for all they do. In stability operations, the threat of force may deter escalation; in a support operation, it may preempt violence and lawlessness.

2-81. The mission essential task list (METL) development process remains the link between anticipated stability operations and support operations missions and predeployment training (see FM 7-0 and FM 7-1). In stability operations, close combat dominance is the principal means Army forces use to influence belligerent actions. The combat tasks, tactics, techniques, and procedures used in offensive and defensive operations are the same as those employed in stability operations. Peace operations, noncombatant evacuation operations, foreign internal defense, and show of force are some examples of stability operations where forces may be required to conduct combat tasks. However, the conditions and standards of performance for these tasks are modified by METT-TC considerations and the more restrictive ROE required in stability operations. Commanders use basic tactical concepts and control measures for offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations. (See FM 3-90.)

2-82. Although Army forces are not specifically organized, trained, or equipped for support operations, their warfighting capabilities are particularly suited to domestic support operations and foreign humanitarian assistance. Units trained for their wartime mission are disciplined with well-established, flexible, and adaptable procedures. Army units have a functional chain of command, reliable communications, and well-equipped organizations. They can operate and sustain themselves in austere environments with organic assets. They can move large forces to the affected area with organic transportation.

2-83. Army engineer, military police, medical, transportation, aviation, and civil affairs assets are especially valuable for support operations. Support operations often require the accomplishment of combat tasks. For example, a scout platoon establishing observation posts in support of counterdrug operations or combat engineers reducing obstacles after a natural disaster. Some missions require specialized training such as that provided by the National Interagency Fire Center to train soldiers in fighting forest fires. Many combat service support missions and tasks are the same across the entire spectrum of operations.

2-84. The major Army command, Army service component, continental US Army, and corps commanders determine the battle focus, resources, and METL that maintain the required readiness posture for anticipated operations in war or military operations other than war. For planned stability operations and support operations, unit commanders may adjust their battle-focused training to reflect the unique aspects of these operations. For units deployed to conduct stability operations or support operations with little or

no preparation, their warfighting competencies will sustain them as they adjust to the stability operation or support operation.

Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data

2-85. The primary challenge for commands executing deployment or redeployment in stability operations and support operations is developing the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD). The TPFDD is critical to refine, validate, and coordinate movement requirements for the force. Unit movement officers must prepare and submit TPFDD through their higher headquarters for the supported combatant commander's validation. Once movement requirements and priorities are validated, the supported combatant commander submits the requirement to the US Transportation Command for scheduling. For support operations in the continental United States, TPFDD validation rests with US Army Forces Command in its role as lead operating agent for US Joint Forces Command. Non-DOD movement requirements and priorities for US domestic disaster relief operations are forwarded through the federal coordinating officer appointed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency to the appropriate defense coordinating officer. FM 3-35 and JP 3-35 further explain deployment and redeployment.

Predeployment Survey

2-86. Before deploying the advance party, a predeployment survey team should move to the location of future operations. The team should be resourced to effectively perform coordination and reconnaissance and to provide information to elements conducting planning. At a minimum, the team should include the officer in charge and appropriate personnel from the specialties of operations, intelligence, logistics, and communications. Depending on the situation, commanders may also consider sending engineer, medical, air liaison, public affairs, PSYOP, civil affairs, legal, explosive ordinance disposal, and unit ministry personnel. This team should include personnel from other US agencies, such as the US Agency for International Development, and may include allied personnel. The United Nations (UN) and specialized agencies will also conduct surveys. Commanders should consult these and other organizations (typically including NGOs) with detailed knowledge of the area.

Transition

2-87. Multinational and multiagency operations will normally require the handover of AOs and responsibilities to other military forces, governmental agencies, or NGOs. Similar to a relief, the military force will carefully plan, coordinate, and manage the transition to the relieving force or agency. The units involved will present a seamless transfer of responsibility, both for efficiency and effectiveness and to prevent any divergence or discrepancy that an adversary may exploit. Planning for transition should begin before deployment and the assumption of the mission. Only through multinational, political-military planning can a proper transition be conducted.

2-88. Transitions between units in offensive and defensive operations are usually reliefs in place focused on units and areas of responsibility. A relief in place is also appropriate in peace operations. But in other stability operations

and support operations, transition by functions may be more effective. Some of these functions include medical and engineer services, local security, communications, and logistics. Forces should not remove a capability until the replacement capability is operating.

Redeployment

2-89. How US forces terminate their involvement in stability operations and support operations may influence the perception of legitimacy of the entire operation. Planners should schedule redeployment of specific units as soon as possible after each unit has completed its part of the operations. This is critical for maintaining readiness for future operations in either the primary role of fighting the nation's wars or deploying for subsequent stability operations or support operations. Additionally, forces must properly account for funds and equipment during the transition.

2-90. Redeployment of military forces will result in a cessation or handover of operational tasks to another agency. The nature of any redeployment may vary from an emergency extraction to an administrative withdrawal or the battle handover of a peace operation mission to another force. When appropriate, redeployment will cover the transfer of operational and administrative activities to relieving troops, responsible NGOs, or civilian authorities. Units must share comprehensive after-action reviews and lessons learned as part of unit recovery operations.

Force Tailoring

2-91. In planning for stability operations and support operations, commanders must tailor a force suitable for the mission. They should plan based on each unit's ability to contribute to achieving national interests and objectives and perceptions of the

Force tailoring is the process of determining the right mix and sequence of units for a mission.

FM 3-0

indigenous population, the international community, and the American public. Commanders should also consider the synergy and enhanced capabilities inherent in joint operations when tailoring the force. Building teamwork early and continually is vital to success when forces are rapidly tailored for the mission.

2-92. The force must be appropriate to the stated goals of the sponsoring authority and provide sufficient capability to deploy, complete the mission, and protect itself. The perception that employed forces exceed the limits of the mandate weakens legitimacy. Suitability varies based on the changing international perceptions, the missions to be performed, the threat, and the intensity of operations. Commanders should prepare for worst-case situations by planning to use combined arms assets.

2-93. The unique requirements of stability operations and support operations will result in the migration of CS and CSS below their doctrinally assigned levels. To maintain flexibility and agility, nondivisional CS and CSS assets can be tailored to the force in division and in some cases brigade levels. Civil affairs, military police, and PSYOP units normally assigned to a corps can be

tailored to the force to augment divisions and brigades. The inherent decentralized execution of stability operations and support operations will continue to create unique challenges when tailoring to the force.

2-94. Reserve component soldiers and units may be included in the US force under specific authority, usually under a Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up Authority. This authority carries with it unique planning requirements. FM 3-35 covers these considerations in detail.

2-95. Commanders must recognize the availability and contribution of civilians and contractors as part of the total force. Civilians may participate to provide expertise not available through uniformed service members and to most effectively use government resources. Support provided by civilians in past conflicts included, but was not limited to, communications, intelligence, contract construction, real estate leasing, water detection, civil engineering technical assistance, and logistic services. Civilians in the nonappropriated fund category staff the service exchanges and provide morale, welfare, and recreation programs. Local civilians may also be a source of both skilled and unskilled labor.

Augmentation and Liaison

2-96. The unique aspects of stability operations and support operations may require individual augmenters and augmentation cells to support personnel shortfalls and unique requirements to tailor the force. Augmentation supports coordination with the media, government agencies, NGOs, other multinational forces, and civil-military elements. METT-TC considerations drive augmentation. Augmentation requires life support, transportation, and communication. Liaison requirements are extensive in joint and multinational operations. Commanders must provide augmentees with resources and quality of life normally provided to their own soldiers.

2-97. Commanders may consider task-organizing small liaison teams to deal with situations that develop with the local population. Teams can free up maneuver elements and facilitate negotiation. Unit ministry, engineers, counterintelligence, linguists, and logistics personnel may be candidates for such teams, but combat elements may also be required. Commanders ensure that teams have transportation and communication allocated.

2-98. Commanders may form special negotiation teams that can quickly locate to diffuse or negotiate where confrontations are anticipated or occur. Teams must have linguists and personnel who have authority to negotiate on behalf of the chain of command (see Appendix E).

Special Technology

2-99. In tailoring the force, commanders must weigh the suitability of using technology based on the nature of the mandate, maintenance requirements, local sensitivities, and other factors. Technology available from battle laboratory experiments, even in small numbers, can make a big difference. Commanders of operations, however, must decide on its use consistent with mission accomplishment.

2-100. Aircraft normally used for transport may conduct air surveillance. Satellites, scout aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, airborne reconnaissance low, and the joint surveillance, target attack radar systems are means of aerial surveillance. Ground surveillance technology—such as radar, night vision devices, sensors, and thermal sights—may also prove useful in stability operations and support operations. All such devices may prove useful in observing and monitoring situations.

2-101. Technology with which soldiers may be less familiar includes using instruments that may assist forces in conducting operations in consonance with the principle of restraint and minimal necessary force. These types of weapons are those that could disrupt communications, radar, computers, or other communications or stop adversaries without killing or wounding them. Such technology requires special consideration of the rules of war or humanitarian practices, unintended environmental or personnel effects, availability and state of development, and postconflict activities or requirements.

2-102. Experimental electronic translation devices may be available through research and development programs, such as those sponsored by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research and Development).